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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










CHIAMAKA WILLIFORD,  
                                    Appellant 
_______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 03-cr-00566-002)  
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 22, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:   FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 






GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Chiamaka Williford (“Williford”) appeals the District Court’s March 1, 
2011 commitment order, revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twelve 
months of imprisonment with no period of supervised release upon release from 
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imprisonment.  Williford contends that the March 1, 2011 sentence was procedurally and 
substantively infirm, because the District Court sentenced him to a prison term above the 
advisory sentencing Guidelines, which recommended a sentence between five (5) and 
eleven (11) months for a Grade C violation.  Williford also argues that the District Court 
failed to consider all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and failed to issue a written 
statement of reasons for the above-Guidelines sentence imposed. 
For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
I.     BACKGROUND 
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and shall recount only the 
essential facts.  Williford is a convicted felon, having pled guilty to two counts of 
distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
860(a), and one count of aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 
feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  The District Court 
imposed a sentence of 46 months of incarceration, to be followed by six years of 
supervised release.  Williford’s supervised release began on February 1, 2007.   
On June 10, 2008, the Probation Office filed a petition alleging that Williford had 
committed multiple violations of the conditions of his supervised release.  At the 
revocation hearing, the District Court found Williford to be in violation of his supervised 
release, and extended his term of supervised release by an additional five months.  
Williford was also ordered to attend a reentry program. 
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Several months later, the Probation Office filed a second petition alleging that 
Williford had violated the conditions of his supervised release.  After a second revocation 
hearing, the District Court further modified the conditions of supervised release, by 
confining Williford to 60 days of house arrest with electronic monitoring and ordering 
him to attend an occupational reentry program. 
More than a month later, the Probation Office filed a third petition, alleging that 
Williford had assaulted the mother of his child and violated the restrictions of house 
arrest.  Following a third revocation hearing, the Court revoked Williford’s supervised 
release, ordered that he be incarcerated for four months, and placed him on supervised 
release for 38 months.   
On November 20, 2009, Williford began his extended term of supervised release.  
Over the next year, he allegedly used marijuana, failed to show up for appointments with 
the Probation Office at required times, failed to obtain employment, failed to report to the 
Probation Office within 72 hours of being arrested, and associated with a co-defendant 
from his underlying narcotics convictions.  These alleged actions resulted in another 
petition being filed.  The Probation Office requested modification of the conditions of 
supervised release, including placement in a residential reentry center for three months.  
Williford waived a revocation hearing and agreed to the proposed modification, and 
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entered a residential reentry center; however, within two weeks Williford was terminated 
from the program for refusing to surrender contraband to the staff upon request.
1
   
Based on this termination, the Probation Office filed another petition alleging that 
Williford violated the terms of his supervised release.  A violation hearing was scheduled 
in short order, but Williford failed to appear.  This failure to appear, coupled with 
Williford’s failure to appear for a drug test the previous Friday, led the District Court to 
issue a bench warrant for Williford’s arrest.  Williford remained a fugitive until February 
24, 2011.     
On March 1, 2011, the District Court held a violation hearing and found that 
Williford violated the conditions of his supervised release by failing to follow the rules of 
the residential reentry center.  After holding a violation hearing, the District Court 
revoked his supervised release and ordered that he be incarcerated for 12 months.  He 
filed a timely notice of appeal.  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 
and § 3583(e), to determine whether to revoke a sentence of supervised release.  See 
United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 851 (3d Cir. 2006) (Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), 
                                                 
1  
The resident supervisor testified that he conducted a wand search and a pat down search 
of Williford and felt an object that he believed to be a cell phone.  The program director 
observed a subsequent pat down search and wand search and also believed that Williford 
was concealing a cell phone.  Williford disputed that the object was a cell phone, but 
refused the program director’s directive to hand over the object.  This violation of 
supervised release is classified in the Sentencing Guidelines as a “C” violation. 
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“when certain conditions are met, a district court can revoke a term of supervised release, 
and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release 
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised 
release.”)(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s final 
judgment of conviction and sentence.  We also have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a) to review the sentence imposed upon a defendant after revocation of supervised 
release. 
 A district court’s sentencing procedure is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007).
 
 On abuse of discretion review, the Court of 
Appeals gives due deference to the district court’s sentencing decision.  Id. at 51.  District 
courts have discretion when sentencing and appellate review is limited to determining 
whether the sentence imposed is reasonable.  Id.  “Our appellate review proceeds in two 
stages.  It begins by ensuring that the district court committed no significant procedural 
error, such as (1) failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines range; (2) treating the Guidelines as mandatory; (3) failing to consider the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; or (4) selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or 
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence and to include an explanation for any 
deviation from the Guidelines range.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 597).  If the district court’s sentence is 
procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
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imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.  Id. at 568.   
 At stage two, we consider a sentence’s substantive reasonableness.  “Our 
substantive review requires us not to focus on one or two factors, but on the totality of the 
circumstances.  At both stages of our review, the party challenging the sentence has the 
burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.”  Id. at 567 (internal quotation marks, 
brackets, and citations omitted).  The procedural and substantive reasonableness of a 
district court’s sentence upon revocation of supervised release is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), sentencing Guidelines were no longer deemed mandatory.  Instead, they were 
deemed advisory.  Since Booker, district courts are required to follow a three-step 
process in determining the appropriate sentence in this advisory scheme.  “(1) Courts 
must continue to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would 
have before Booker.  (2) In doing so, they must formally rule on the motions of both 
parties and state on the record whether they are granting a departure and how that 
departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and take into account our Circuit’s pre-
Booker case law, which continues to have advisory force.  (3) Finally, they are required 
to exercise [their] discretion by considering the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors, in setting the 
sentence they impose regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the 
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Guidelines.”  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 The sentencing judges are statutorily required to state their reasons for imposing a 
sentence, although a comprehensive, detailed opinion is not required.  Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).  The judge must provide an explanation that is 
sufficient to “satisfy the appellate court that [the district court] considered the parties’ 
arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decision-making 
authority.”  Id.   
 Williford contends that the District Court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors 
when it sentenced him to twelve months of imprisonment for a Grade C technical 
violation of his supervised release, and did not address its rationale for the sentence it 
imposed.  We disagree.  Under the Statutory Guidelines, after considering the § 3553(a) 
factors, the district court may: 
revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in 
prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for 
the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit 
for time previously served on postrelease supervision, if the court, pursuant 
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of 
probation or supervised release, finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, except that a 
defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required 
to serve on any such revocation more than 5 years in prison if the offense 
that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class A felony, more than 
3 years in prison if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years in 
prison if such offense is a class C or D felony, or more than one year in any 
other case. 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 
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 According to § 7B1.4(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, and based on a 
criminal history category of III, the range of imprisonment applicable for 
revocation of a Grade C violation is 5 to 11 months.  Further, Commentary 3 to § 
7B1.4 states that “[i]n the case of a Grade C violation that is associated with a 
high risk of new felonious conduct . . . an upward departure may be warranted.” 
The District Court was not required to impose a sentence within the 
advisory Guidelines range.  It could have imposed a sentence up to the statutory 
maximum of 2 years of imprisonment.  The advisory Guidelines range was 
correctly calculated from 5 to 11 months of imprisonment.  The District Court 
considered arguments from the government and Williford’s counsel regarding the 
sentence to be imposed.  Williford’s counsel requested a sentence in the “several 
month” advisory Guidelines range, and the government discussed the 5 to 11 
month range.  After considering all of the abovementioned factors, the District 
Court exercised its discretion in sentencing Williford to 12 months of 
imprisonment.  In doing so, there was no abuse of discretion. 
The next step in sentencing is to “consider those arguments in light of the § 
3553(a) factors.”  Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247.  Williford contends that the District 
Court did not consider the § 3553(a) factors.  We disagree.  The District Court is 
not required to list each factor.  It is evident from the transcript of the last 
 
 9 
revocation hearing that the Court considered the factors.
 2
  We find that the 
District Court considered the § 3553(a) factors.  The nature and seriousness of the 
offense is reflected in the record regarding Williford’s extensive interactions with 
the District Court, including the recitation of the countless revocation hearings the 
Court held.  The District Court discussed the need for the sentence imposed, 
apparently patience and deterrence had not worked.  Although reluctant to exceed 
the Guidelines, the District Court revoked Williford’s supervised release and 
sentencing him to 12 months of imprisonment.  The record shows that the District 
Court considered the § 3553(a) factors.   
Most important, the District Court took into account that Williford became 
a fugitive, thus disobeying the Court’s Order.  Also, the District Court noted 
“[t]here’s no question he’s a serial violator. . . .”  Williford had at least four 
revocation hearings over time. 
 The substantive component of a reasonableness review requires the appellate court 
to take into account the totality of the circumstances.  United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 
214, 217 (3d Cir. 2009).  Although the appellate court considers the extent of any 
variance from the advisory Guidelines range, it must also give due deference to the 
district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the 
                                                 
2
 “A sentencing court need not make findings as to each factor if the record otherwise 
makes clear that the court took the factors into account.”  United States v. Cooper, 437 
F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).  A district judge “should set forth enough to satisfy the 
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 
exercising his own legal decision making authority.”  Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. 
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variance.  Id.  The substantive reasonableness of each sentence must be evaluated on its 
own terms, based on the reasons that the district court provided, in light of the particular 
facts and circumstances of that case.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 574.  In looking at the totality 
of the circumstances, we determine whether a reasonable court would have applied the 
same sentence as the district court.  See Lychock, 578 F.3d at 219 n.2. 
 Here, the sentence was not procedurally unreasonable.  The only question for us to 
resolve is whether the District Court abused its discretion in sentencing Williford to one 
month above the advisory Guidelines range.  The District Court did not commit a 
procedural error; the appropriate U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range was not contested by 
either party, and the District Court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory.  In addition, 
the District Court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and selected a sentence 
based on appropriate facts elucidated in the record.  The District Court adequately 
explained the sentence it imposed.  The sentence is substantively reasonable.  The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Williford to 12 months of 
imprisonment.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
